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The Multi-faceted Aspects of Asylum-Law
Applicable to Africa: Analysis for Reflection
GINO J. NALDI AND CRISTIANO D’ORSI*
I. INTRODUCTION
The plight of Africa’s refugees and displaced persons remains
an enduring legacy of the conflicts, political unrest, human rights
abuses,1 impoverishment, natural disasters and environmental
degradation2 that has plagued the continent and contributed to the
displacement of millions of people over many decades.3 Most
recently, the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan,4 the economic,
*

Gino J. Naldi, LL.M., Ph.D, University of Birmingham (United Kingdom), is an Independent
Researcher in International Law. Cristiano D’Orsi, Ph.D., Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies, Geneva (Switzerland) is a Grotius Post-Doctoral Research Scholar at the
University of Michigan Law School, affiliated with the Program in Refugee and Asylum Law.
Cristiano would like to thank the staff of the libraries of both the Graduate Institute of
International and Development Studies in Geneva (Switzerland) and the University of Michigan
Law School in Ann Arbor for providing him with much assistance during the drafting of this
article. Cristiano would also like to thank and dedicate this work to Cora, a truly special person,
for her ongoing support during the final and decisive stages of this work.
1. The United Nations (UN) established links between human rights violations and
population displacements. See World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993,
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, § 1 ¶ 23(2), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July
12, 1993); United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, § 6 ¶ 26, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 8, 2000); Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on Int’l Cooperation to Avert New Flows of Refugees, 41st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/41/324 (May 13, 1986);
Rep. of the Secretary-General, Further Promotion and Encouragement of Human Rights a.nd
Fundamental Freedoms, Including the Question of the Programme and Methods of Work of the
Commission: Human Rights, Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons, ¶¶ 4–12, 25, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1996/42 (Feb. 8, 1996). The Organization of African Unity (OAU), the predecessor
of the African Union (AU), which was formally dissolved in 2002, also acknowledged this
nexus. See OAU First Ministerial Conference on Human Rights in Africa, Grand Bay
(Mauritius) Declaration and Plan of Action, 11 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 352, 355 ¶ 9 (1999).
2. See G.A. Res. S-19/2, ¶¶ 7, 9, 73, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-19/2 (Sept. 19, 1997).
3. U.N. Secretary General, The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace
and Sustainable Development in Africa: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶¶ 7–15, U.N. Doc.
A/52/871-S/1998/318 (Apr. 13, 1998) [hereinafter Causes of Conflict 1998]; TIYANJANA
MALUWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN POST-COLONIAL AFRICA, 171-76 (1999).
4. Over two million people have been displaced as a result. Rep. of the Secretary-
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social and political collapse in Zimbabwe,5 drought, crop failure and
famine in east Africa,6 and the political revolution known as the
“Arab Spring” that swept much of North Africa in 2011 have all
added to the large-scale flow of refugees and those seeking asylum.
Over the years, host States have expressed concern about the social,
financial and security implications caused by the reception of large
numbers of refugees and refuge seekers7 and their ability to cope.8
The strain on resources, infrastructure and social cohesion imposed
by the so-called refugee burden has given rise to a more restrictive
application and definition of refugee status, particularly among
European States, which have developed concepts such as “safe
countries of origin,” “in-country processing” and “safe return.”9
Some States have even resorted to extraterritorial processing
centers for refuge seekers.10 Many refuge seekers are classified as
General, Specific Groups and Individuals: Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons, ¶¶ 6, 9, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2006/71/Add.6 (Feb. 13, 2006).
5. Although there has been improvement in some areas with the advent of the powersharing “Inclusive Government” in 2011, the overall situation remains of concern. U.K.
FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: THE 2011 FOREIGN &
COMMONWEALTH
OFFICE
REPORT,
2012
381-87,
available
at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32906/
Cm-8339.pdf [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS 2011]; see generally ANDREW MELDRUM, WHERE WE
HAVE HOPE: A MEMOIR OF ZIMBABWE (2004).
6. The crisis is acute in Somalia. HUMAN RIGHTS 2011, supra note 5, at 316.
7. The term “refuge seeker” will be used in this essay in preference to that of “asylum
seeker” since the latter can be given pejorative connotations.
8. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of
Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, ¶ 56, U.N. Doc. A/67/205*S/2012/715 (July 27, 2012, reissued in Sept. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Causes of Conflict 2012].
9. See Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for
Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of the European Communities, June 15, 1990,
1997 O.J. (C 254) 1, (as amended by Council Regulation 343/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 50) 1 (EC))
(establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for
examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country
national); Council Directive 2004/83/EC, arts. 4–12, 20–37, 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12, 15-18, 2023 (EC) (describing minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country
nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international
protection and the content of the protection granted) [hereinafter Qualification Directive];
GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS BETWEEN THE STATES
138–42 (1978). The European Court of Human Rights has criticized France’s use of “transit
zones” to avoid examining asylum applications. Amuur v. France, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 826,
845-50. It appears that African States have not been immune from these restrictive trends.
See Cristiano D’Orsi, Legal Aspects of Asylum in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Deadlock or a Concrete
Hope for a Better Future?, 7 REGENT J. INT’L L. 223, 232–33 (2010).
10. For example, Australia has a policy of sending refuge seekers to Pacific Islands,
such as Nauru. See Richard Barnes, Refugee Law at Sea, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q 47, 48 (2004).
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displaced persons or economic migrants and thus denied refugee
status. Despite often lacking the necessary resources to cope with
the refugee burden, African States have nevertheless contributed
significantly to the progressive development of international
refugee law and policy.11 One of the distinctive features of the panAfrican approach to dealing with the refugee problem is the
prominence given to the concept of asylum, which is the focus of
this essay.12 However, before so doing, it is necessary to briefly
explain the concept of asylum, and to distinguish it from that of the
refugee; although they overlap, they are not identical.13
II. ASYLUM UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
The legal regime that seeks to protect the refugee or refuge
seeker is characterized, on the one hand, by the principle of state
sovereignty and, on the other hand, by competing principles of
humanitarian considerations, derived in large measure from
international law and the work of the United Nations (UN) and its
agencies.14 While States have accepted limitations on their
11. The OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa
is innovative in a number of respects. See generally OAU Convention Governing the Specific
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, adopted Sept. 10, 1969 1001 U.N.T.S. 45; See
MALUWA, supra note 3, at 180; see also GINO J. NALDI, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY: AN
ANALYSIS OF ITS ROLE 89 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter NALDI, AU ORG.]; Paul Weis, The
Convention of the Organization of African Unity Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee
Problems in Africa, 3 REVUE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 449, 449–64 (1970); Rainer Hofmann,
Refugee Law in an African Context, 52 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 318, 329 (1992); Emmanuel
Opoku Awuku, Refugee Movements in Africa and the OAU Convention on Refugees, 39 J. AFR. L.
79, 83 (1995); Alice Edwards, Refugee Status Determination in Africa, 14 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 204, 232–33 (2006). The Convention, adopted under the auspices of the OAU, entered
into force in 1974 and has been ratified by 45 of the AU’s 54 Member States. Ratification
Table: AU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, ACHPR,
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/refugee-convention/ratification/ (last visited Dec. 26,
2013). All of the OAU/AU treaties are available at: http://au.int/en/treaties.
12. See generally OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems
in Africa, supra note 11, art. 2.
13. ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 187-89 (2005).
14. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has recognized that
refuge seekers are in need of international protection. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees,
Conclusions Adopted by the Executive Committee on the International Protection of
Refugees, 1975-2009 (Conclusion No. 1-109) (Dec. 2009), available at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b28bf1f2.html; see ERICA-IRENE A. DAES, STATUS OF THE
INDIVIDUAL AND CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROMOTION, PROTECTION AND RESTORATION
OF HUMAN RIGHT AT NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS 34 (1992). Thus, the
European Court of Human Rights has emphasized that a broad consensus exists to the effect
that refuge seekers are members of a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable

NALDI_FOR_PUB

118

10/21/2014 6:42 PM

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 36:115

sovereign rights over the entry of foreign nationals into their
territory, it remains true that international refugee law is a legal
regime of protection that is still far from comprehensive.
Asylum traditionally referred to sanctuary sought or offered to
individuals fleeing political or other kinds of oppression; it
essentially amounted to protection granted to a foreign national
against the exercise of jurisdiction by another State.15 The refuge
granted was usually considered temporary rather than
permanent.16 Under traditional international law, States possessed a
right to grant asylum.17 The so-called right of “territorial asylum,” in
the sense of refuge or protection, has been defined as “the
competence of every State to allow a prosecuted alien to enter, and
to remain on, its territory under its protection, and thereby to grant
asylum to him.”18 Lung-Chu Chen has described asylum as
“peculiarly humanitarian, designed to provide a safe haven for
individuals fleeing their land of origin to escape political, religious,
or racial persecution.”19 European Union (“EU”) law has developed
the concept of “subsidiary protection,” sometimes described as
“complementary international protection,” which refers to a third
country national or stateless person needing international
protection based either on humanitarian grounds or human rights
population group in need of special protection. M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R.
28, ¶ 251 (2011).
15. GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 172 (2d ed. 1996).
16. See Howard Adelman, Refuge or Asylum A Philosophical Perspective, 1 J. REFUGEE
STUD. 7, 7–19 (1988). It is therefore interesting to note that Member States are required to
provide people coming within the scope of the Directive 2001/55 of July 20, 2001
temporary leave to remain for no longer than one year in order to provide a coordinated
response to large influxes of displaced peoples as a result of armed conflict, endemic
violence, or serious human rights violations. See Council Directive 2001/55/EC, art. 4, 2001
O.J. (L 212) 12, 14 (EC).
17. Richard B. Lillich, Civil Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND
POLICY ISSUES 115, 152 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984).
18. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE, VOL. I.—PEACE 678 (H. Lauterpacht
ed., 8th ed. 1955). It has been said therefore that, “the right to asylum implies permitting the
refugee to remain in the place of asylum.” DAES, supra note 14, at 34. See also GOODWIN-GILL,
supra note 9, at 138 (“[T]he right of asylum is the right of the State to grant protection,
which in turn is founded on the ‘undisputed rule of international law’ that every State has
exclusive control over the individuals within its territory. Today, this exclusively
jurisdictional approach has been mitigated somewhat by increased recognition of
protection as a humanitarian duty. . . . Nevertheless, it is still to be doubted whether there is
any rule which obliges States to admit those fleeing from persecution.”).
19. LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A POLICYORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 187 (2d ed. 2000).
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law “who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom
substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person
concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin . . . would face
a real risk of suffering serious harm . . . and is unable, or, owing to
such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of
that country.”20 Asylum is therefore comprised of several
components: admission of the individual to the territory of the host
State,21 leave to remain in the territory of the host State, and nonrefoulement, the principle that prohibits the expulsion or return of
refugees to territories where their lives or freedom may be
endangered.22 The important point to note is that the concept of
asylum is broader than that of refugee; unlike refugee status, a wellfounded fear of persecution is not a prerequisite for those seeking
asylum since the root cause may well be conflict, natural disaster or
other circumstances that do not satisfy the legal definition of
persecution.23 Thus, under the EU’s Qualification Directive, a person
20. Council Directive 2011/95/EU, art. 2(f), 2011 O.J. (L 337) 9, 13 (EC) [hereinafter
Directive 2011/95/EU]; Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 78, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47
[hereinafter TFEU]; see Ryszard Piotrowicz & Carina van Eck, Subsidiary Protection and
Primary Rights, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 107, 108 (2004).
21. However, it has been argued that under international human rights law, the need
for international protection imposes upon States a positive duty to protect refuge seekers at
risk in their own countries, for example, by issuing entry visas. See Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 55
Eur. Ct. H.R. 627, ¶¶ 177–78 (2012) (Pinto de Albuquerque, J., concurring); JAMES C.
HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 310 (2005). In fact, most
States take active measures to prevent refugees reaching their territory. See Sale v. Haitian
Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 160 (1993).
22. JOHN P. GRANT & J. CRAIG BARKER, PARRY & GRANT ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 511 (3d ed. 2009). See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, arts. 31–33; CHEN, supra note 19, at 186; Cristiano D’Orsi,
The AU Convention on Refugees and the Concept of Asylum, 7 PACE INT’L L. REV. 225, 228
(2012) [hereinafter Convention Relating to Status of Refugees, 1951]. Forty-seven of the
AU’s Member States, as well as Morocco, have ratified the UN Convention. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?&src=UNTSONLINE&mtdsg_no=V~2&cha
pter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&lang=en#Participants (last visited Jan. 11, 2014).
23. See AUST, supra note 13, at 187; see also DAES, supra note 14, at 34. A well-founded
fear of persecution is a core factor in the determination of refugee status. See Convention
Relating to Status of Refugees, 1951, supra note 22, art. 1(A)(2); Directive 2011/95/EU,
supra note 20, art. 2(d). The actual determination of this question has usually been a matter
for the municipal courts, and their interpretations may be at variance. Compare the
relatively restrictive definitions of the House of Lords in R v. Sec’y of State for the Home
Dep’t, Ex parte Sivakumaran, [1988] 2 W.L.R. 92, 97-98, and the U.S. Supreme Court in
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 437 (1987), with
the more liberal opinion of the Australian courts exemplified in M38/2002 v. Minister for
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who does not qualify for refugee status but is seeking subsidiary
protection must establish “a real risk of suffering serious harm”24—
the concept of “serious harm” being defined as the death penalty,
execution, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, punishment of
an applicant in the country of origin, or serious and individual
threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate
violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.25
Such individuals who are in need of complementary international
protection are often known as humanitarian or de facto refugees.26
The disadvantage, of course, is that States may rightly consider
themselves as under no legal obligation to admit humanitarian
refugees. This distinction has been criticized for creating a secondclass category of refugees, subject to a discriminatory regime with
fewer rights.27
A central element of the traditional concept of asylum is that,
while it entails a derogation from sovereignty, States generally
retain absolute discretion as to who they admit into their territory;
and ultimately, the granting of asylum remains within their

Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) FCAFC 131 (Austl.). It has been held
that those fleeing armed conflicts are not per se refugees under the terms of the UN
Convention. See Adan v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [1999] 1 A.C. 293 (H.L.) 296;
Vilvarajah v. United Kingdom, 215 Eur. Ct. H.R. 35 (1992). However, the decisions of the
European courts should now be read in light of the definition of “acts of persecution”
contained in the Qualification Directive, article 9, and “reasons for persecution” set out in
article 10 thereof. See Qualification Directive, supra note 9, arts. 9–10; Directive
2011/95/EU, supra note 20, arts. 9–10.
24. Helene Lambert, The EU Asylum Qualification Directive, its Impact on the
Jurisprudence of the United Kingdom and International Law, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 161, 166
(2006); see also Case C-465/07, Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 2009 E.C.R. I-00921,
¶ 26(2). But Member States may have more favorable standards for determining such
status. See Qualification Directive, supra note 9, art. 3; see also Joined Cases C-57/09 & C101/09, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. B & D, 2010 E.C.R. I-10979, ¶ 12.
25. See Qualification Directive, supra note 9, art. 15; see also Elgafaji, supra note 24, ¶
12; Piotrowicz & van Eck, supra note 20, at 112–36. However, in European human rights
law, the standard may be stricter: “the risk of serious harm may result from foreign
aggression, internal armed conflict, extrajudicial death, enforced disappearance, death
penalty, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, forced labour, trafficking in human
beings, persecution, trial based on a retroactive penal law or on evidence obtained by
torture or inhumane and degrading treatment, or a ‘flagrant violation’ of the essence of any
Convention right in the receiving State (direct refoulement) or from further delivery of that
person by the receiving State to a third State where there is such a risk (indirect
refoulement).” See Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 55 Eur. Ct. H.R. 627, ¶ 168.
26. Adelman, supra note 16, at 7–19.
27. Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 55 Eur. Ct. H.R. 627, ¶ 170.
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reserved domain.28 If it were otherwise, States would be under a
legal duty to grant it. In that regard, Philip C. Jessup wrote:
The right of asylum in international relations . . . has been talked
about as if it were a right of the individual, whereas actually
under traditional international law it has referred to the right of
a state to afford a safe haven to individuals who sought its
protection. The state was privileged, not obligated, to grant
asylum . . . it must follow that even under a modern law of
nations the individual would not have a right of asylum in the
sense of a right to require any particular state to receive him. But
precedent and humanity would suggest that every state should
be under an obligation to grant temporary refuge to persons
fleeing from persecution.29

One learned author has pithily summed up the situation with:
“[it is] the right of a state to grant asylum; an individual has no right
to demand asylum.”30 Another writer has written that “the grant of
asylum . . . is conferred by states in their discretion. Aliens have no
‘right’ of asylum, it is merely the right of the state to grant it.”31
There is no entitlement on the part of the applicant who is at the
mercy of the State’s exercise of discretion.32 However, this does not
mean that the issue of asylum has wholly escaped international
attention.
Since the end of the Second World War, attempts have been
made, albeit tentative and piecemeal, to regulate and improve the
status of humanitarian refugees.33 These international
developments, however modest, have nevertheless impacted States’
28. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 520 (7th ed. 2008);
Attorney-Gen. for the Dominion of Canada v. Cain, [1906] A.C. 542 (P.C.) 546 (appeal taken
from Ont.); M38/2002 v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003]
FCAFC 131, ¶ 33 (Austl.). According to the established case law of the European Court of
Human Rights “States have the right, as a matter of well-established international law . . . to
control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens.” Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 55 Eur. Ct. H.R.
627, ¶ 140. See generally Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 34 (1985); Saadi v.
Italy, 2008-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 145, 242.
29. PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 82–83 (1948).
30. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 117
(7th rev. ed. 1997); see also OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 678; DAES, supra note 14, at 35;
DAVID J. LATHAM, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 132 (1970).
31. AUST, supra note 13, at 187; see also OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 675; DONALD W.
GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 441 (2d ed. 1976). See generally Cardoza-Fonseca, supra note 23,
480 U.S. 421.
32. Cardoza-Fonseca, supra note 23, 480 U.S. at 444.
33. THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 15, at 174–79.
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sovereign right to determine who should be granted entry to
national territory. The first significant step was Article 14(1) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) (UDHR), which
provides that “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other
countries asylum from persecution.”34 Apart from the fact that the
UDHR does not impose binding treaty obligations on States,35 any
assumed responsibility extends merely to conceding to individuals
the right to request asylum, but not to compelling States to grant
asylum.36 According to Greig, “Article 14 gave no additional
protection because it merely recognized the minimal entitlement of
an individual to ask to enter or remain in the state of refuge.”37 Such
modest progress was nevertheless welcomed because it signified “a
deep community concern to transform the matter of asylum from
the domain of ‘state discretion’ to that of international
humanitarian concern.”38 The UN Convention on Refugees (1951)
did not materially advance the cause of humanitarian refugees,
34. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 14(1), U.N. Doc.
A/Res/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
35. Although adopted as a hortatory document, it is widely believed that the UDHR has
acquired a normative status, either because the UDHR constitutes an authoritative
interpretation of the human rights provisions of the UN Charter, because in all important
respects it has become customary international law, or because it reflects contemporary
general principles of law. See Accordance with International Law of Unilateral Declaration
of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶¶ 202–04 (July
22) (separate opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade); DAES, supra note 14, at 22; PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 28, at 559; IAN BROWNLIE, BASIC DOCUMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 255 (4th ed. 1995); A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
WORLD 29 (4th ed. 1996); John P. Humphrey, The International Bill of Rights: Scope and
Implementation, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 527, 529 (1976); Louis B. Sohn, The New
International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV.
1, 16 (1982); Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Source of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus
Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUST. Y.B. OF INT’L L. 82, 84, 93 (1992). However, Brownlie
expressly makes an exception with regard to Article 14(1) which he writes “could hardly be
said to represent legal rules.” PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 28, at 559.
36. Lillich, supra note 17, at 152-53; PIRKKO KOURULA, BROADENING THE EDGES: REFUGEE
DEFINITIONS AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION REVISITED 273 (1997). Thus the right of asylum
enshrined in the UDHR is described as “more accurately the right of the state to grant
asylum to individuals rather than the state’s duty to honor an individual’s request for
asylum.” ROBERT L. BLEDSOE & BOLESLAW ADAM BOCZEK, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW DICTIONARY 89
(1987).
37. GREIG, supra note 31, at 442; see also THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
15, at 175; Humphrey, supra note 35, at 528. According to Ott, Lauterpacht was critical of
UDHR, Article 14 for using misleading language which he believed did not, nor was intended
to, confer a right to be granted asylum. DAVID H. OTT, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
MODERN WORLD 252 (1987).
38. CHEN, supra note 19, at 185.
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although certain provisions are applicable to the issue of asylum.39
In 1967, the UN General Assembly expanded upon the basic right
set out in the UDHR with the unanimous adoption of the Declaration
on Territorial Asylum without affecting the underlying premise that
the Declaration is without prejudice to the sovereignty of States.40
No other universal instruments specifically dedicated to the issue of
asylum have been adopted since.41 However, the influential Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World
Conference on Human Rights in 1993, repeats all essential aspects
of Article 14(1) of the UDHR.42
Progress in the adoption of binding legal instruments at the
regional level has been made, however. For the moment, leaving
aside the situation in Africa—which will be discussed fully below—
agreement on asylum as an individual right has been possible in the
Americas region.43 In 1954, Latin America states adopted the
Caracas Convention on Territorial Asylum, which confers asylum on
individuals who are persecuted in their States of origin for their
beliefs, opinions or political affiliations, or for acts that may be
considered political offences.44 Significantly, the Cartagena
Declaration on Refugees (1984) expanded the situations under
which refugee status is recognized.45 More important, however, is
Article 22(7) of the American Convention on Human Rights (1969),
adopted under the auspices of the Organization of American States,
39. GREIG, supra note 31, at 442 (writing that the Convention did not establish any
right of entry for the refugee); see also S115/00A v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural
Affairs [2001] 180 ALR 561, ¶ 6 (Austl.).
40. See Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312 (XXII), 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6716, at 81 (1967). According to Bledsoe and Boczek, the Declaration,
“offers guidelines for granting asylum but is not legally binding upon states nor very specific
in its content.” See BLEDSOE & BOCZEK, supra note 36, at 89.
41. Note the UN Draft Convention on Territorial Asylum. THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 15, at 510-12. According to GREIG, supra note 31, at 443, the text makes only
limited progress as it “proved as difficult as ever to obtain agreement on a substantial
modification of the principle of state sovereignty in favour of the position of the refugee.” In
DAES, supra note 14, at 35, Daes writes that, while the UN Conference on Territorial Asylum
in 1977 failed to adopt a treaty on the subject, it “had sufficient time to reject by an
overwhelming majority language that would have accorded a right to asylum.”
42. See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 1.
43. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OEA/Ser.L./V.II.23, doc. 21,
rev. 6 (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the InterAmerican
System,
OEA/Ser.L.V./II.82,
doc.
6,
rev.
1,
available
at
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/2.AMERICAN%20DECLARATION.pdf.
44. THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 15, at 436–38.
45. Id. at 21; see also id. at 444–48.
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which states that every person has the right to seek and be granted
asylum, albeit conditional upon “the legislation of the state and
international conventions.”46 This builds upon Article XXVII of the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 1948 that
provides, inter alia, “Every person has the right, in case of pursuit
not resulting from ordinary crimes, to seek and receive asylum in
foreign territory.”47 These documents are significant because they
bestow a right on the individual, in particular, one that has been
elevated to a human right capable of judicial enforcement.
In more recent years, the EU’s gradual removal of restrictions
on the free movement of persons necessitated increased cooperation on a variety of issues, including asylum.48 At a European
Council meeting at Tampere in 1999, Member States set themselves
the goal of establishing a common EU policy on immigration and
asylum leading to a Common European Asylum System (C.E.A.S.).49
To that end, harmonizing legislation has been adopted providing for
common rules for refuge seekers.50 What is relevant for the present
46. American Convention on Human Rights art. 22(7), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S.
123.
47. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 43, art. XXVII
(emphasis added). While the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man was
adopted as a non-binding document, it is believed to have undergone a transformation
similar to that of the UDHR and is today considered to be an authoritative interpretation of
the human rights referred to in the Charter of the Organization of American States.
Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within the
Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion
OC-10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 10, ¶¶ 43–45 (July 14, 1989).
48. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 63,
Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 OJ (C 325) 33 [hereinafter TEEC].
49. Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council (Oct. 15-16, 1999).
50. At the centre of the C.E.A.S. is the Qualification Directive that establishes minimum
standards on the conditions to be satisfied by refuge seekers to be accepted into a EU
Member State, and the content of the protection granted. The European Commission has
found that the current EU asylum procedure is defective because the minimum standards
are (a) insufficient and (b) vague. M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 28, ¶ 251
(2011). Nevertheless, refuge seekers are thereby accorded certain rights. For example,
under Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003, on minimum standards for the
qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as
persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection
granted, EU member states must guarantee refuge seekers material reception conditions.
“‘[M]aterial reception conditions’ shall mean the reception conditions that include housing,
food and clothing.” Council Directive 2003/9/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 31) 18. In contrast, Directive
2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005, on minimum standards on procedures in member states
for granting and withdrawing refugee status in the member states, guarantees certain
procedural safeguards in relation to asylum applications. Council Directive 2005/85/EC,
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discussion is that the directive that provides, on one hand, a
definition of a “traditional” refugee and, on the other hand, those
other persons in need of international protection. It should be
observed initially that the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights,
adopted in 2000 and binding as of 2009, guarantees the right to
asylum, but besides the Charter’s restricted scope,51 the right is
linked to the UN Convention and cannot, therefore, be said to
expand the concept. Thus, the Qualification Directive provides a
uniform definition of refugee that is based on the UN definition52
and describes who qualifies for “subsidiary protection” in the EU—
somebody at “real risk of suffering serious harm.”53
Attention should be drawn to a more recent positive
development. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Human Rights Declaration (AHRD), adopted by ASEAN in November
2012,54 contains a qualified right of asylum.55 However, it is
important to note that the AHRD is a non-binding instrument and
its significance should not therefore be over emphasized.
Nevertheless, like the UDHR it may exercise a persuasive influence
on ASEAN States.56
The question arises whether a right of asylum can be said to
exist in contemporary general international law. In the Asylum Case,
the International Court of Justice, in the context of diplomatic
asylum but which seems equally applicable to territorial asylum,
dismissed the suggestion of the existence of such a customary right,
stating that “the principles of international law do not recognise any
rule of unilateral and definitive qualification by the state granting
2005 O.J. (L 326) 13; see also M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 28, ¶ 46 (2011).
The view has been expressed that the content of international protection applicable to
refugees and that applicable to refuge seekers is strictly identical for both categories of
persons Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 55 Eur. Ct. H.R. 627, ¶ 170 (2012) (Pinto de Albuquerque, J.,
concurring).
51. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union arts. 51-52, Dec. 12, 2007,
2010 O.J. (C 83) 389, 402–03.
52. Qualification Directive, supra note 9, art. 2(c).
53. Id. art. 2(e), at 14.
54. Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN Human Rights Declaration
(Nov.
19,
2012),
available
at
http://www.asean.org/news/asean-statementcommuniques/item/asean-human-rights-declaration.
55. Id. art. 16 (“Every person has the right to seek and receive asylum in another State
in accordance with the laws of such State and applicable international agreements.”).
56. ASEAN Human Rights Declaration: A Step Forward or a Slide Backwards?, CONVERSATION
(Nov. 21, 2012), available at https://theconversation.com/asean-human-rights-declaration-astep-forward-or-a-slide-backwards-10895.
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asylum.”57 Certainly, learned writers of the period shared this
assessment.58 H. Lauterpacht is also (perhaps reluctantly) of this
view—he raised the question of whether it ought not to be
considered as a general principle of law as understood by Article 38
of the Statute of the World Court.59 Notwithstanding the passage of
time, there appear to be no grounds to revise the view that there is
little support for the international legal recognition of an
individual’s right to be granted asylum.60 This indeed was the
conclusion of the European Court of Human Rights in Vilvarajah v
United Kingdom.61 Thus, Guy Goodwin-Gill writes that international
instruments do not permit “the conclusion that States have
accepted an international obligation to grant asylum to refugees . . . .
[T]he humanitarian practice exists, but the sense of obligation is
missing.”62 However, one contemporary author has written that “[i]t
may be that in law a right of asylum will arise for ‘urgent and
compelling reasons of humanity.’”63 It therefore seems possible to
conclude that while, in general, no right to asylum exists, states are
under a moral and humanitarian obligation to consider pleas for
asylum in good faith.

57. Asylum (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.C.J. 266, 274 (Nov. 20).
58. See Felice Morgenstern, The Right of Asylum, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 327, 352 (1949);
Frank E. Krenz, The Refugee as a Subject of International Law, 15 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 90, 115
(1966).
59. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 677.
60. See generally DAES, supra note 14. Lillich, supra note 17, at 153 thus concluding that
asylum is “[c]ertainly . . . not part of customary international law.” See also THE REFUGEE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 15, ch. 5; In 1966, Frank E. Krenz noted that “[t]he
realisation of an individual right to asylum is still to await some kind of formal recognition.”
Frank E. Krenz, The refugee as a subject of international law, 15 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 90, 115
(1966). In 1949, Felice Morgenstern also observed, “It would thus appear that the practice
of states has not created a right of individuals to asylum, except, perhaps, in the matter of
non-extradition of political offenders.” See Felice Morgenstern, The Right of Asylum, 26 BRIT.
Y.B. INT’L L. 327, 352 (1949).
61. See generally Vilvarajah v. United Kingdom, 215 Eur. Ct. H.R. 34 (1992). It should
be observed that no right of political asylum exists under the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR). Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831, 1853; see also
Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 55 Eur. Ct. H.R. 627, ¶ 140 (2012) (Pinto de Albuquerque, J.,
concurring); Saadi v. Italy, 2008-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 145, 242.
62. THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 15, at 178 (emphasis added).
63. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 759 (6th ed. 2008).
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III. THE LAW OF ASYLUM IN AFRICA
A. The OAU Convention on Refugees
The grave and enduring refugee problems confronting Africa
in the 1960s: mass population displacement caused by the struggle
for national liberation, apartheid and drought and famine,
convinced the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that the UN
Convention on Refugees did not fully meet Africa’s needs.64 The
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in
Africa adopted by the OAU in 1969 sought to engage with these
problems in an African context. The OAU Convention is the effective
regional complement to the UN Convention;65 it does not seek to
exclude the operation of the UN Convention from Africa, rather the
substantive measures of protection provided for therein but not
included in the OAU Convention apply.
The OAU Convention constituted an advance on the existing
protection of refugees in a variety of ways. The narrower definition
of a refugee contained in the UN Convention was considered illequipped to adequately address the specific problems that Africa
was facing.66 Consequently, the UN Convention definition, that is,
persecution on grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of
a particular social group or political opinion, is incorporated in
Article 1(1) of the OAU Convention. But paragraph 2 thereof
broadens it, stating that:
The term ‘refugee’ shall also apply to every person who, owing to
external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events
seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of
his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his
place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another
place outside his country of origin or nationality.67

64. FRANS VILJOEN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 254-55 (2007). In fact,
eight different categories of African refugees have been identified. Hofmann, supra note 11,
at 323.
65. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
supra note 11, art. 8(2). The preamble acknowledges that the UN Convention constitutes the
basic instrument relating to the status and treatment of refugees. Doebbler v. Sudan, Comm.
No.
235/00,
27th
Activity
Report
2009,
¶
125,
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/46th/comunications/235.00/achpr46_235_00_eng.p
df.
66. VILJOEN, supra note 64, at 255–56; NALDI, AU ORG., supra note 11, at 82–83.
67. Doebbler v. Sudan, Comm. No. 235/00, ¶ 131.
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The African definition of refugee is thus widened to include
those in need of complementary international protection, namely,
internationally or externally displaced persons and humanitarian
refugees; that is, “all those persons who are forced to leave their
country of origin in order to escape violence” or intimidation in
various manifestations, “regardless of whether they are in fact
personally in danger of political persecution.”68 The significance is
that “objectively ascertainable circumstantial compulsion” becomes
a factor in determining refugee status.69 It has been suggested that
this definition should be updated and expanded in line with the
non-discrimination clause of Article 2 of the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights to encompass persons fearing
persecution for reasons such as ethnicity, colour, language or sex.70
Although the issue of large-scale influxes is not expressly
mentioned in the OAU Convention, it seems that subsequent
practice and policy has established that persons displaced as a
result of conflict, famine or human-made or natural disasters come
within the protective scope of the definition and would qualify as
68. Hofmann, supra note 11, at 323. See generally Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 55 Eur. Ct. H.R.
627, ¶¶ 177–78 (2012) (Pinto de Albuquerque, J., concurring). According to the African
Commission, “[i]nternational protection is granted to refugees because they do not enjoy the
protection of their own home countries.” Doebbler v. Sudan, Comm. No. 235/00, ¶ 149. The
European concept of “subsidiary protection” as defined in the Qualification Directive thus
appears indebted to the broader African definition.
69. VILJOEN, supra note 64, at 255; Awuku, supra note 11, at 81.
70. Rose M. D’Sa, The African Refugee Problem: Relevant International Conventions and
Recent Activities of the Organization of African Unity, 31 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 378, 382 (1984);
see also African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, art. 8(1), adopted Jan. 30,
2007,
AFR.
UNION,
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/AFRICAN_CHARTER_ON_DEMOCRACY_ELECTIO
NS_AND_GOVERNANCE.pdf. It should be observed that the AU Convention on the Protection
and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in Africa 2009 (Kampala Convention),
entered into force 6 December 2012, prohibits arbitrary displacement of persons as a result
of racial discrimination. African Union Convention on the Protection and Assistance to
Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, art. 4(4)(a), adopted Oct. 23, 2009, 49 I.L.M. 83
[hereinafter Kampala Convention]. See also Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions v. The
Sudan, Communication Nos. 279/03 & 296/05, ACHPR, ¶ 223 (May 13-27, 2009),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/45th/comunications/279.03296.05/achpr45_279.03_296.05_eng.pdf (protecting the right of individuals and peoples “of
every race, ethnicity, religion, and other social origins”). Given that consensual homosexual
acts constitute criminal offences in many African countries, there is an argument for
extending the definition to cover sexual orientation. It is interesting to note that the
Qualification Directive specifically recognizes gender-based persecution, and persecution
based on, inter alia, colour, ethnicity, and sexual orientation. Qualification Directive, supra
note 9, arts. 9.2(f), 10.1(a), (d).
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refugees for the purposes of the Convention.71 This generous regime
appears to have been motivated, as stated in the preamble to the
OAU Convention, by “the need for an essentially humanitarian
approach towards solving the problems of refugees.”72 Later
treaties adopted by the OAU/AU have sought to ensure that the
more vulnerable members of society, particularly women and
children, are equally protected by refugee law.73 Therefore, the view
that the restrictive concept of the refugee, as originally contained in
the UN Convention, has evolved and expanded under the influence
of progressive international human rights standards to encompass
individuals in need of complementary international protection can
tentatively be advanced.
B. Human Rights
Justice cannot be done to any discussion of the rights of
refugees, humanitarian or other, without taking into consideration
the relevance of human rights. As will be explained, human rights
71. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, art. 23(4), adopted July 1,
1990,
AFR.
UNION,
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Charter_En_African_Charter_on_the_Rights_and_
Wlefare_of_the_Child_AddisAbaba_July1990.pdf. See also Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 55 Eur. Ct. H.R.
627, ¶ 170 (“Groups of refugees cannot be subject to a diminished status based on an
‘inherent’ mass-influx exception to ‘genuine’ refugee status. To provide reduced, subsidiary
protection . . . for people who arrive as part of a mass influx would be unjustified
discrimination.”). It is interesting to note that the definition of internally displaced persons
(IDPs) expressly reflect such causes as they are defined as “persons or groups of persons
who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual
residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict,
situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made
disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.” Kampala
Convention, supra note 71, art. 1(k); Rep. of the Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on
Internal Displacement, Introduction ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998)
(by Francis M. Deng). A simpler definition is: those who have fled for reasons “‘traceable to
conflicts, or radical political, social or economic changes.’” DAES, supra note 14, at 34. It
needs to be recalled that the Temporary Protection Directive was specifically designed to
respond to large-scale influxes of displaced persons as a result of armed conflict, endemic
violence, or systematic human rights violations. It does not extend to other situations such
as natural catastrophes. Council Directive 2001/55/EC, supra note 16, art. 2(c).
72. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
supra note 11, preamble ¶ 2.
73. See African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, supra note 71, art. 23;
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in
Africa arts. 4(2)(k), 10(2)(c)-(d), 11(3), adopted July 1, 2003, AFR. UNION,
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol%20on%20the%20Rights%20of%20Wo
men.pdf; see also Kampala Convention, supra note 71, arts. 7(5), 9(2)(d), 13(4).
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are applicable in principle to refugees and refuge seekers.74 Given
that this subject forms an integral part of this essay, it is necessary
at this juncture to briefly explain the human rights regime specific
to Africa. The protection of human rights in Africa is based
principally on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(African Charter) adopted by the OAU in 1981.75 The African
Charter is distinctive for enshrining all three generations of human
rights in a single binding legal document.76 Responsibility for
promoting and ensuring the protection of human and peoples’ rights
rests primarily with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights (African Commission), a quasi-judicial body.77 As part of its
protective mandate, the African Commission is competent to entertain
applications or communications alleging violations of the African
Charter from individuals or NGOs.78 Its decisions on communications
do not formally have the binding force of a ruling of a court of law but,
rather, have a persuasive authority.79 However, an expectation of

74. See Qualification Directive, supra note 9, at art. 12; see Piotrowicz & van Eck, supra
note 20, at 109–36. The European Court of Human Rights has stated that refuge seekers
must not be deprived of the protection afforded by the UN Convention and the ECHR.
Amuur v. France, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 826, 848; M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 53 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 28, ¶ 251 (2011); see also Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 55 Eur. Ct. H.R. 627, ¶ 185; Saadi v. U.K.,
2008-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 31, 47–50, 60–61; CCPR Communication No. 560/1993, 59th Sess., Mar.
24-Apr. 11, 1997, ¶ 9.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (Apr. 30, 1997). The
applicability of human rights to such persons follows inexorably from the concept of
jurisdiction as laid out in, for example, Article 1 ECHR. See generally DAVID J. HARRIS ET AL.,
LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 804-07 (2d ed. 2009). It should be
observed that the Kampala Convention expressly affirms that IDPs enjoy human rights. See
Kampala Convention, supra note 71, arts. 3(1)(d), 20(2).
75. African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, 1520
U.N.T.S. 217. It has been ratified by all the Member States of the AU, with the exception of
South Sudan. Ratification Table: African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ACHPR,
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ratification/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2013).
76. Centre for Minority Rights Development and Minority Rights Group International
on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, 276/2003, ACPR, ¶ 149 (Feb. 4, 2010),
available
at
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/46th/comunications/276.03/
achpr46_276_03_eng.pdf. See KONSTANTINOS D. MAGLIVERAS & GINO J. NALDI, THE AFRICAN
UNION AND THE PREDECESSOR ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, 161–63 (2004); U. OJI
UMOZURIKE, THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 161–63 (1997).
77. African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, supra note 75, arts. 30, 45. See
MAGLIVERAS & NALDI, supra note 76, at 199–203; EVELYN A. ANKUMAH, THE AFRICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE’S RIGHTS: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES 13-50 (1996).
78. These so-called “other” communications are governed by the African Charter. African
Charter on Human and People’s Rights, supra note 75, arts. 55–59. See MAGLIVERAS & NALDI,
supra note 76, at 205–17.
79. African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, supra note 75, art. 58(2).
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compliance has developed.80
The African Commission shares its protective mandate with the
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.81 The contentious
jurisdiction of the Court embraces all cases and disputes submitted
that concern the interpretation and application of, inter alia, the
African Charter and any other relevant human rights instrument
which a State has ratified,82 such as the OAU Convention.83 The
African Commission has standing before the Court.84 The judgments
of the Court are binding on the parties.85 The Court is empowered to
adopt such provisional measures of protection as it deems
necessary in cases of “extreme gravity and urgency” and “to avoid
irreparable harm to persons.”86
80. Id. art. 1; Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria, 129/94, ACHPR, ¶¶ 16–17 (Mar.
1995),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/17th/comunications/129.94/achpr17_129_94_eng.p
df. It seems that the African Commission has come to regard its decisions on
communications as binding. International PEN and Others v. Nigeria, 137/94-139/94154/96-161/97,
ACHPR,
¶¶
113–16
(Oct.
31,
1998),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/24th/comunications/137.94-139.94-154.96161.97/achpr24_137.94_139.94_154.96_161.97_eng.pdf.
81. The Protocol entered into force on January 25, 2004 and, at the time of this writing,
had been ratified by 27 AU Member States. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art.
2,
adopted
June
10,
1998,
AFR.
UNION,
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/PROTOCOL_AFRICAN_CHARTER_HUMAN_PEOPL
ES_RIGHTS_ESTABLISHMENT_AFRICAN_COURT_HUMAN_PEOPLES_RIGHTS_1.pdf
[hereinafter Establishment of an African Court Protocol]. However, this Court is due to be
replaced by the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. Protocol on the Statute of the
African Court of Justice and Human Rights art. 2, adopted July 1, 2008, AFR. UNION,
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/PROTOCOL_STATUTE_AFRICAN_COURT_JUSTICE
_AND_HUMAN_RIGHTS.pdf.
82. Establishment of an African Court Protocol, supra note 81, art. 3; African Comm’n
on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Order for
Provisional Measures, App. No. 004/2011, ACHPR, ¶¶ 14–19 (Mar. 25, 2011),
http://www.african-court.org/en/images/documents/OrdersFiles/Copy%20of%20Order%20for%20provisional%20measures%20Appl%200042011%20%282%29-Copy.pdf.
83. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
supra note 11, art. 8(2).
84. Establishment of an African Court Protocol, supra note 81, art. 5(1)(a). In March
2011 the African Commission instituted proceedings against Libya alleging serious and
massive violations of human rights guaranteed under the African Charter. African Comm’n
on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Order for
Provisional Measures, App. No. 004/2011, ¶¶ 1–3.
85. Establishment of an African Court Protocol, supra note 81, arts. 28(2), 30.
86. Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, supra
note 81, art. 27(2). In March 2011, the Court adopted provisional measures proprio motu
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It must not be overlooked that the rights guaranteed by the
African Charter have been deemed equally applicable to nonnationals and refugees.87 This fact is especially significant because
the protection afforded by international human rights law is more
generous than that of international refugee law, which has had to
adapt to comply with these often superior norms.88 By virtue of
Article 1 of the African Charter, State parties have assumed a
binding legal obligation to recognize and uphold the rights, duties
and freedoms therein89 and, in accordance with Article 2 of the
African Charter, they are additionally obliged to secure the rights
protected by the African Charter to all persons within their
jurisdiction, nationals and non-nationals alike.90 Specific Charter
rights relating to refugees that the African Commission has upheld
include the right to life,91 the right to human dignity,92 the right to
ordering Libya to refrain from activities resulting in the violation of rights under, inter alia,
the African Charter. African Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Great Socialist
People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Order for Provisional Measures, App. No. 004/2011, ¶¶
10-13.
87. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v. Angola, 292/04, ACHPR, ¶
84
(May
7-22,
2008),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/43rd/comunications/292.04/achpr43_292_04_eng.p
df. See generally RACHEL MURRAY, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: FROM THE OAU TO THE AFRICAN
UNION 185–234 (2004). The rights and freedoms enshrined in the African Charter are
similarly relevant to the internally displaced. Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on
Housing Rights and Evictions v. Sudan, 279/03-296/05, ACHPR, ¶¶ 186–90 (2009). In
Doebbler v. Sudan, Comm. No. 235/00, ¶ 126, the African Commission expressed the view
that the provisions of the UN Convention, the OAU Convention, and the African Charter
complement each other.
88. Jane McAdam, Research Paper No. 125, The Refugee Convention as a Rights
Blueprint for Persons in Need of International Protection, UNHCR – NEW ISSUES IN REFUGEE
RESEARCH, 3–4 (July 2006), http://www.unhcr.org/44b7b7162.html.
89. International PEN and Others v. Nigeria, 137/94-139/94-154/96-161/97, ACHPR,
¶ 116 (Oct. 31, 1998), http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/24th/comunications/137.94139.94-154.96-161.97/achpr24_137.94_139.94_154.96_161.97_eng.pdf; Sir Dawda K.
Jawara
v.
Gambia,
147/95-149/96,
ACHPR,
¶
46
(May
11,
2000),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/27th/comunications/147.95149.96/achpr27_147.95_149.96_eng.pdf; Purohit and Moore v. Gambia, 241/01, ACHPR, ¶
43
(May
2003),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/33rd/comunications/241.01/achpr33_241_01_eng.p
df.
90. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v. Angola, 292/04, ¶¶ 22,
84; Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v. Guinea, 249/02, ACHPR, ¶ 68
(2004),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/36th/comunications/249.02/achpr36_249_02_eng.p
df.
91. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 75, art. 4; Organisation
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liberty and security of the person,93 the right of access to judicial
protection,94 and the right to property.95 Article 8(2) of the African
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance also reinforces the
obligation of State Parties to guarantee, inter alia, the rights of refugees
and displaced persons.96
The violation of refugees’ human rights on a massive scale in
recent years has engaged the attention of the international community.
The international community responded in a collective and forceful
manner to the conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region; the conflict broke out
in 2002, and led to the forced displacement of civilian populations due
to attacks and atrocities perpetrated against them by the Janjaweed
militia.97 The UN Security Council categorized this conflict as a threat to
international peace and security.98 In demanding that the Sudanese
mondiale contre la torture, Association Internationale des juristes démocrates, Commission
internationale des juristes, Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme v. Rwanda, 27/8946/91-49/91-99/93,
ACHPR,
¶
24
(Oct.
1996),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/20th/comunications/27.89-46.91-49.9199.93/achpr20_27.89_46.91_49.91_99.93_eng.pdf; Institute for Human Rights and
Development in Africa v. Guinea, 249/02, ¶¶ 33, 47.
92. Organisation mondiale contre la torture v. Rwanda, 27/89-46/91-49/91-99/93, ¶
26; Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v. Guinea, 249/02, ACHPR, ¶¶ 57,
62. The European Court of Human Rights held in a number of cases that detention
conditions for refuge seekers must be compatible with Article 3 of the ECHR. See S.D. v.
Greece, App. No. 53541/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (June 11, 2009), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-93034; see also Tabesh v.
Greece, App. No. 8256/07, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 38–44 (Nov. 26, 2009), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-95892#; A.A. v. Greece, App.
No. 12186/08, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 57–65 (July 22, 2010), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-100014; M.S.S. v. Belgium
and Greece, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 28, ¶ 72–79 (2011) (finding a further breach of Article 3 due to
squalid living conditions in which applicant was forced to live).
93. Organisation mondiale contre la torture v. Rwanda, 27/89-46/91-49/91-99/93, ¶
26. See also Amuur v. France, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 826, 848 (stating that under Article 5 of
the ECHR, the confinement of, in casu, refuge seekers could only be brief and was acceptable
only in order to enable States to prevent unlawful immigration).
94. Organisation mondiale contre la torture v. Rwanda, 27/89-46/91-49/91-99/93,
¶¶ 34–35; see also Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831, 1871 (holding that
an effective remedy against the rejection of an asylum application is required under Article
13 of the ECHR).
95. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v. Angola, 292/04, ¶ 3.
96. African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, supra note 71, art. 8(2).
97. John E. Tanagho & John P. Hermina, The International Community Responds to
Darfur: ICC Prosecution Renews Hope for International Justice, 6 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 367,
376-77 (2009).
98. U.N. S.C. Res. 1556, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1556, at 2 (July 30, 2004) (imposing sanctions
on Sudan); e.g., S.C. Res. 1784, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1784, at 1–2 (Oct. 31, 2007). In 2004, the
U.N. Secretary General, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564, and acting under
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Government put a stop to these attacks and disarm the militia, the UN
Security Council also called for measures to prevent or mitigate the
humanitarian catastrophe.99 An international presence was initially
established by the AU in 2004 as a monitoring mission in the form of
the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which was mandated, inter
alia, to contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of
humanitarian aid along with the return of refugees and the internally
displaced.100 A UN presence followed in the form of the United Nations
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), established under Security Council
Resolution 1590, which was additionally given the task of facilitating
the voluntary return of refugees and the internally displaced by
helping establish the necessary security conditions.101 However, AMIS
encountered numerous difficulties, including militia attacks and
obstruction to humanitarian access, which led to the creation of a
hybrid AU/UN peacekeeping operation, UNAMID.102 Furthermore, due
to the destabilizing effect the Darfur conflict has had on neighboring

Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, established an International Commission of Inquiry on
Darfur to investigate alleged violations of human rights law and international humanitarian
law. U.N. S.C. Res. 1564, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1564, ¶ 12 (Sept. 18, 2004); U.N. S.C. Rep. of the
Secretary-General on the Sudan pursuant to Paragraph 15 of Security Council Resolution
1564 (2004) and paragraphs 6, 13 and 16 of Security Council Resolution 1556, U.N. Doc.
S/2004/787 (Oct. 4, 2004). The Commission found that the Government of Sudan and the
Janjaweed were responsible for serious violations of human rights law and international
humanitarian law amounting to crimes under international law and recommended that the
Security Council refer the Darfur conflict to the International Criminal Court. U.N. S.C. Rep.
of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the Secretary-General, Feb. 1, 2005,
U.N. Doc. S/2005/60, at 3-5 (2005). Under Resolution 1593, the U.N. Security Council
referred the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. U.N.
S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005). A warrant for the arrest of the
President of Sudan, Omar Al Bashir, was re-issued in July 2010. Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan
Ahmed Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-95, (July 12, 2010), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc907140.pdf.
99. See U.N. S.C. Res. 1556, supra note 98, ¶¶ 6–8, 12; see also U.N. S.C. Res. 1591, ¶ 7,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1591 (Mar. 29, 2005) (adopted pursuant to Chapter VII UN Charter). The
African Commission has also expressed its concern for the situation in Darfur. See, e.g.,
African Union, Twentieth Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and People’s
Rights, Annex III, EX.CL/279 (IX) (2006). See Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on
Housing Rights and Evictions v. Sudan, 279/03-296/05, ACHPR, ¶¶ 2, 228 (2009) (where
the African Commission found that Sudan had committed widespread and gross violations
of the African Charter in Darfur).
100. See African Union, Communiqué of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Peace and
Security Council, ¶¶ 4, 6, AU Doc. PSC/PR/Comm. (XVII) (Oct. 20, 2004) (endorsed by the UN
Security Council Resolution 1556). See U.N. S.C. Res. 1556, supra note 98, at 2.
101. See U.N. S.C. Res. 1590, ¶¶ 1, 4(b), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1590 (Mar. 24, 2005).
102. See U.N. S.C. Res. 1769, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769, at 2-3 (July 31, 2007).
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countries, the UN authorized, pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, the deployment of an EU operation in Eastern Chad and
North-Eastern Central African Republic with a view, inter alia, to
protect refugees and the internally displaced.103
C. Asylum
A notable development, at the heart of this discussion, is the
fact that the OAU Convention makes explicit acknowledgement of
the issue of asylum.104 Article 2(1) states: “Member States of the
OAU shall use their best endeavours consistent with their
respective legislations to receive refugees and to secure the
settlement of those refugees who, for well-founded reasons, are
unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin or
nationality.”105
It is important to understand that this provision does not
confer an automatic right to asylum; there is no entitlement on the
part of the applicant. The wording of this paragraph makes it clear
that no legal obligation is imposed on States; the language used in
this instance—“best endeavours”—is recommended rather than
mandatory.106 The States’ ability to maintain and grant asylum,
described in Article 2(2) as a “peaceful and humanitarian act,”107
remains within their discretion.108 This position was subsequently
reaffirmed by the 1979 Arusha Conference,109 which confirmed in
103. See U.N. S.C. Res. 1778, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1778 (Sept. 25, 2007).
104. See Hofmann, supra note 11, at 324. At the very least, it goes beyond what is
provided for in the UN Convention, but probably no further than what is provided for in the
UN Declaration on Territorial Asylum. Awuku, supra note 11, at 82; Ahmad M. Rifaat,
Refugees and the Right of Asylum: an African Perspective, 40(1) REVUE EGYPTIENNE DE DROIT
INT’L 71, 106 (1984); Bahame Tom Mukirya Nyanduga, Refugee Protection Under the 1969
OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 47 GER. Y.B.
INT’L L. 85, 94 (2004).
105. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
supra note 11, art. 2(1).
106. See Weis, supra note 11, at 457; Hofmann, supra note 11, at 324; Awuku, supra note
11, at 83. It has been claimed that the obligation is a moral rather than a legal one. See Paul
Kuruk, Refugeeism: A Dilemma in International Human Rights: Problems in the Legal
Protection of Refugees in West Africa, 1 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 179, 218-19 (1987).
107. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
supra note 11, art. 2(2). See, e.g., OAU, Addis Ababa Document on Refugees and Forced
Population Displacements in Africa (Sept. 10, 1994) [hereinafter OAU Addis Ababa Doc].
108. See Hofmann, supra note 11, at 324; D’Sa, supra note 70, at 387.
109. The Pan African Conference on the Situation on Refugees in Africa held at Arusha,
Tanzania in May 1979 and sponsored by the OAU, UNHCR, the ECA and voluntary
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Recommendation 1 that general international law acknowledged no
right of asylum and that the discretion of States remained
unconstrained.110 Nevertheless, it was recognized that the OAU
Convention constituted an improvement on the existing legal
position and that the right of an individual to asylum seemed to be
gaining wider acceptance throughout Africa.111 In 1995, the OAU
was therefore able to take the position that the granting of asylum
should be considered a responsibility and an obligation under
international law.112
Another humanitarian gesture is that of temporary residence,
provided for by Article 2(5) of the OAU Convention: “where a
refugee has not received the right to reside in any country of
asylum, he may be granted temporary residence in any country of
asylum in which he first presented himself as a refugee . . . .”113 The
view has been expressed that the combined effect of this
accommodation and the principle of non-refoulement gives rise to a
right of temporary admittance.114
Such limited advances must now be seen in light of a
development of “real and practical significance,”115 that is, the
inclusion of a right of asylum in Article 12(3) of the African Charter.
This states that: “Every individual shall have the right, when
persecuted, to seek and obtain asylum in other countries in
accordance with the laws of those countries and international
conventions.”116
An initial, but albeit significant, observation is that the right of
asylum is enshrined in a human rights treaty capable of

organizations, was convened to review all aspects of refugee problems in Africa within the
scope of the OAU and UN Conventions and their causes. D’Sa, supra note 70, at 390. The
Arusha Conference “adopted a number of recommendations on ‘The Situation of Refugees in
Africa and Perspective Solutions to the Problem in the 1980s.’” Id. at 390–91.
110. ORG. OF AFR. UNITY, THE RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE ARUSHA CONFERENCE ON THE
AFRICAN REFUGEE PROBLEM 8 (Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1981).
111. Id.
112. OAU, Regional Conference on Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced
Persons in the Great Lakes Region, 1995/BUJCONF.6, ¶ 25 (Feb. 17, 1995) [hereinafter OAU
Great Lakes Refugees].
113. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
supra note 11, art. 2(5).
114. See Awuku, supra note 11, at 83.
115. See ANKUMAH, supra note 77, at 139.
116. African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, supra note 75, art. 12(3).
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implementation and enforcement by an individual.117 According to
the African Commission, this provision includes “a general
protection of all those who are subject to persecution, that they may
seek refuge in another state.”118 However, it would be unwise to
assume that an open-door policy has been established. The
definition of “persecution” assumes a critical importance.119 The
wording of the provision, “when persecuted,” is capable of a
restrictive interpretation in that refugees are required to have
suffered actual persecution rather than simply demonstrating the
more generous standard of a well-founded fear of persecution as
required by refugee law.120 The African Commission’s use of the
phrase, “those who are subject to persecution,”121 suggests that this
may well be the case. Therefore, does the definition also extend to
people fleeing extreme poverty or environmental disasters? This is
a question that awaits resolution.
D. Non-discrimination
Both the UN and OAU Conventions are to be applied to all
refugees without discrimination on specified grounds.122 The
grounds listed in the UN Convention are somewhat narrower in
scope than those contained in Article 4 of the OAU Convention,
which refers to race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinions.123 This right is
117. See ANKUMAH, supra note 77, at 139.
118. See Organisation mondiale contre la torture, Association Internationale des juristes
démocrates, Commission internationale des juristes, Union Interafricaine des Droits de
l’Homme v. Rwanda, 27/89-46/91-49/91-99/93, ACHPR, ¶ 31 (Oct. 1996),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/20th/comunications/27.89-46.91-49.9199.93/achpr20_27.89_46.91_49.91_99.93_eng.pdf
119. See ANKUMAH, supra note 77, at 140. The definition of “acts of persecution”
contained in the Qualification Directive, article 9, is therefore useful. See Qualification
Directive, supra note 9, art. 9. It must be observed that, while such acts must be “sufficiently
serious” or “sufficiently severe,” the definition is not exhaustive. See Directive 2011/95/EU,
supra note 20, art. 9.
120. See ANKUMAH, supra note 77, at 139–40.
121. See Organisation mondiale contre la torture v. Rwanda, 27/89-46/91-49/9199/93, ¶ 31.
122. See Convention Relating to Status of Refugees, 1951, supra note 22, art. 3; OAU
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, supra note 11, art.
4. The Kampala Convention also contains a general non-discrimination clause. See Kampala
Convention, supra note 71, arts. 3, 5; Council Directive 2001/55/EC, supra note 16, ¶ 16;
Directive 2011/95/EU, supra note 20, ¶ 17.
123. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
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strengthened by the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in
Article 2 of the African Charter.124 As has been seen, Article 2
guarantees every individual the rights pledged therein without
distinction on a wide number of specified grounds, including sex,
race, ethnic or national origin, political opinion or religion. 125 The
African Commission appears to be uncertain as to whether Article 2
is restricted to discrimination only with respect to the rights set out
in the African Charter or whether it amounts to a general
prohibition against discrimination. On the one hand, it has stated
that Article 2 “does not stipulate a general banning of
discrimination; it only prohibits discrimination where it affects the
enjoyment of a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter.”126 Yet
on the other hand, it has stated that “Article 2 of the Charter lays
down a principle that is essential to the spirit of this convention,
one of whose goals is the elimination of all forms of discrimination
and to ensure equality among all human beings. . . . [I]t is apparent
that international human rights law and the community of States
accord a certain importance to the eradication of discrimination in
all its guises.”127 Irrespective of this debate, the fundamental point is
that the principle of non-discrimination can be invoked by refugees,
usually in association with other rights.128 In Organisation Mondiale
Contre La Torture and the Association Internationale des Juristes
supra note 11, art. 4.
124. African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, supra note 70, art. 8.
125. In Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe, 245/02, ACHPR, ¶ 170 (May
11-15,
2006),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/39th/comunications/245.02/achpr39_245_02_eng.p
df, the African Commission defined discrimination as “applying any distinction, exclusion,
restriction or preference” based on grounds such as “race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and
which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or
exercise by all persons, on equal footing, of all rights and freedoms.”
126. See Antonie Bissangou v. Congo, 253/02, ACHPR, ¶ 69 (Nov. 15-29, 2006),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/40th/comunications/253.02/achpr40_253_02_eng.p
df.
127. Malawi African Association et al v Mauritania, 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97–
196/97,
210/98,
ACHPR,
¶
131
(May
11,
2000),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/27th/comunications/54.91-61.91-96.93-98.93164.97_196.97-210.98/achpr27_54.91_61.91_96.93_98.93_164.97_196.97_210.98_eng.pdf;
see Purohit and Moore v. Gambia, 241/01, ACHPR, ¶ 43 (May 2003),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/33rd/comunications/241.01/achpr33_241_01_eng.p
df.
128. African Charter on Democracy, Election and Governance, supra note 70, art. 8;
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe, 245/02, ¶ 171.
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Democrates and Others v. Rwanda, the African Commission found
that the expulsion of Burundi refugees from Rwanda was motivated
by their nationality or membership of a particular ethnic group and
was thus a clear violation of Article 2 of the African Charter.129 In
African Institute for Human Rights and Development (on behalf of
Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea) v. Republic of Guinea, the African
Commission held that mass expulsion of refugees amounted to
discriminatory action contrary to Article 4 of the OAU Convention
and Article 2 of the African Charter.130
E. Non-refoulement
Article 2(3) of the OAU Convention assures the principle of
non-refoulement—that is, that a person classified as a refugee131
should not be returned or expelled to a country where they fear
persecution or ill-treatment,132 or where “widespread serious

129. Organisation mondiale contre la torture, Association Internationale des juristes
démocrates, Commission internationale des juristes, Union Interafricaine des Droits de
l’Homme v. Rwanda, 27/89-46/91-49/91-99/93, ACHPR, ¶ 23 (Oct. 1996),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/20th/comunications/27.89-46.91-49.9199.93/achpr20_27.89_46.91_49.91_99.93_eng.pdf; see also 249/02: Institute for Human
Rights and Development in Africa v. Guinea, 249/02, ACHPR, ¶ 69 (2004),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/36th/comunications/249.02/achpr36_249_02_eng.p
df.
130. See also Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v. Guinea, 249/02,
¶¶ 69, 74.
131. However, the argument has been advanced that the principle of non-refoulement
applies equally to those who have not yet had their status determined. Evolving
international refugee law, shaped by international human rights law, obligates the State to
investigate, of its own motion, any situation involving a need of international protection.
This State obligation applies even in cases where an explicit request for asylum is absent,
and also in cases where evidentiary validation of the asylum application is inadequate. In
such cases, no automatic negative conclusions should be drawn Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 55 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 627, ¶¶ 170–71 (2012) (Pinto de Albuquerque, J., concurring).
132. Or “not sending a refugee to a country where the persecution in question is
feared.” DAES, supra note 14, at 34. According to the UNHCR, non-refoulement is, in addition
to a binding treaty obligation, a rule of customary international law and a human right,
quoted in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 28, ¶ 41–42 (2011)2. See also THE
REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 15, 140-41; Zaoui v. Att’y Gen. [2005] 1 NZLR
690, ¶ 34 (SC) (N.Z.); Revenko v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2000] EWCA Civ. 500,
[18], [2001] Q.B. 601, 612; Haitian Centre for Human Rights v. United States, Case 10.675,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 51/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 88 (1997).
According to the African Commission, non-refoulement is a principle “which has taken an
increasingly fundamental character as one of the cornerstones of international refugee law.”
Doebbler v. Sudan, Comm. No. 235/00, ¶ 150. Consequently, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque
held it to be a rule of jus cogens. Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 55 Eur. Ct. H.R. 627, ¶ 172.
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problems of insecurity” exist133—is equally applicable to
humanitarian refugees.134 It is argued that the principle set out in
the OAU Convention has a wider scope than that contained in its
corresponding provision of the UN Convention, Article 33(1),135 in
that it applies also to measures such as rejection at the frontier,
which would force a person to remain in an unsafe territory.136 In
essence, the non-refoulement obligation in the OAU Convention
amounts to an obligation to admit and host humanitarian refugees.
However, it appears that, in practice, there is little difference. 137
Ultimately, it would seem that a law-abiding, bona fide refugee
cannot be expelled.138
The UN Convention lists exceptions to the principle of nonrefoulement in the interests of national security or public order.139
By way of contrast, it has been suggested that the OAU Convention

133. See Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 55 Eur. Ct. H.R. 627, ¶ 147.
134. By analogy with the UN Convention. Convention Relating to Status of Refugees,
1951, supra note 22, art. 33; THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 15, at 137;
Lambert, supra note 24, at 161–62; see TFEU, supra note 20, art. 78. The Qualification
Directive explicitly states that the principle of non-refoulement recognized in Article 21.1
applies equally to persons eligible for subsidiary protection. Qualification Directive, supra
note 9, art. 20.2; see also Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 55 Eur. Ct. H.R. 627, ¶ 170.
135. But only if interpreted restrictively. It should be observed that there is a lack of
uniformity in the interpretation and scope of the principle in state practice. See generally
Ellen F. D’Angelo, Non-Refoulement: The Search For a Consistent Interpretation of Article 33,
42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 279, 279–315 (2009).
136. Hofmann, supra note 11, at 324–25. This is consistent with an expansive approach
to the obligation under the UN Convention. D’Angelo, supra note 135, at 287.
137. THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 15, at 170-71.
138. Indeed, expelling refugees and refuge seekers to high-risk countries can constitute
arbitrary repatriation. Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 55 Eur. Ct. H.R. 627, ¶¶ 147–48. In Doebbler v.
Sudan, it was claimed that thousands of Ethiopian refugees were subjected to forced
repatriation by Sudan and the UNHCR as a consequence of an agreement between the two
parties whereby it was determined that said refugees were to lose their refugee status in
accordance with Article 1(c)(5) UN Convention, the so-called “cessation clause.” However,
the African Commission found no evidence that refugees had been returned or that their
human rights had been violated. Doebbler v. Sudan, Comm. No. 235/00, ¶¶ 118, 163.
139. Such individuals do not qualify for or lose the status of refugees or protected
person. Convention Relating to Status of Refugees, 1951, supra note 22, art. 33; see Joined
Cases C-57/09 & C-101/09, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. B & D, 2010 E.C.R. I-10979, ¶¶
12, 101. Membership of a terrorist organization and participation in terrorist activities may
be incompatible with the Qualification Directive, supra note 9, art. 12.2, but cannot
automatically justify exclusion or loss of refugee status; an individual assessment of any
threat posed must be made. Id. ¶¶ 91–94. It should be observed that human rights law has
had a considerable impact on the application of these exceptions to the benefit of the
refugee. Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 55 Eur. Ct. H.R. 627, ¶¶ 171–73.
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guarantees the principle of non-refoulement without exception.140
This is because the provision in question refers to a person, rather
than a refugee. And, unlike the UN Convention, the OAU Convention
is silent on the question of returning refugees. However, doubt has
been cast on this view if other provisions of the OAU Convention are
considered.141 Hence, refugee status may be lost where a person has
committed or is suspected of committing a serious non-political
crime outside the country of refuge,142 has “seriously infringed the
purposes and objectives of this Convention,”143 is guilty of acts
contrary to the purposes and principles of the OAU and UN,144 or is
suspected of incidents of international crime.145 Furthermore, since
Article 3(1) of the OAU Convention states that a refugee is under a
duty to abide by the laws of the country of asylum, including
measures taken for the maintenance of public order, any breach
thereof may result in the loss of refugee status and expulsion may
ensue. Indeed, in African Institute for Human Rights and
Development (on behalf of Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea) v.
Republic of Guinea, the African Commission held that the State was
entitled to prosecute persons by necessary implication refugees
who posed a security threat to the State.146
An associated feature is the prohibition on refugees engaging
in subversive activities contained in Article 3(1) of the OAU
Convention.147 This principle is in keeping with Article 4(o) of the
140. THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 15, at 140.
141. D’Sa, supra note 70, at 388. Thus, Awuku, supra note 11, at 82, is of the view that
the OAU’s exclusion clause is stricter than that of the UN Convention.
142. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
supra note 11, arts. 1(4)(f), 1(5)(b); see also Convention Relating to Status of Refugees,
1951, supra note 23, art. 1(F)(b); Qualification Directive, supra note 9, art. 12(2)(b).
Terrorist acts come within the scope of this provision. Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. B &
D, 2010 E.C.R. I-10979, ¶ 81.
143. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
supra note 12, art. 1(4)(g).
144. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
supra note 12, art. 1(5)(c)-(d); see also Convention Relating to Status of Refugees, 1951,
supra note 22, art. 1(F)(c); Qualification Directive, supra note 9, art. 12(2)(c). Terrorist acts
are contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN. Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. B & D,
2010 E.C.R. I-10979, ¶ 83.
145. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
supra note 11, art. 1(5)(a); see also Convention Relating to Status of Refugees, 1951, supra
note 22, art. 1(F)(a); Qualification Directive, supra note 9, art. 12(2)(a), at 18.
146. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v. Guinea, 249/02, ¶¶ 71–72.
147. Under the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in
Africa, supra note 11, art. 3(2), State parties are under an obligation to prohibit refugees
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AU’s Constitutive Act148 (and Article 3(5) of the OAU Charter before
it), Article 23(2) of the African Charter, and the OAU Declaration on
the Problem of Subversion.149 This principle appears to be a sensible
proscription to prevent unrest and incitement to violence.150 A
person who does not abide by such a prohibition could lose his/her
refugee status in accordance with Article 1(4)–(5) of the OAU
Convention and face expulsion.151 The conflict in the Great Lakes
Region of Central Africa in recent years highlights the difficulties
that these provisions seek to address. Forced population
movements combined genuine refuge seekers with armed gangs
and individuals who had committed serious crimes, including
crimes against humanity.152 Unrest was fomented in refugee camps,
which were used as bases to launch attacks against neighboring
States.153 As a result, security forces raided some refugee camps and
refugees were killed and dispersed.154 In order to protect bona fide
refugees in these dangerous circumstances, the UNHCR put forward
residing in their territories from attacking, or engaging in any subversive activities, against
any AU Member State.
148. See Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 4(r),
adopted
July
11,
2003,
AFR.
UNION,
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/PROTOCOL_AMENDMENTS_CONSTITUTIVE_ACT
_OF_THE_AFRICAN_UNION.pdf.
149. GINO J. NALDI, DOCUMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY 57 (1992).
150. In Resolution 1161, the UN Security Council acknowledged the threat posed to the
stability of the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa posed by malicious propaganda. U.N.
S.C. Res. 1161, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1161 (Apr. 9, 1998). See also Causes of Conflict 1998, supra
note 3, ¶ 53. However, the term “subversive activities” has been criticized for vagueness and
the possibility that it could be invoked to curb legitimate activities. Weis, supra note 11, at
459; Awuku, supra note 11, at 83.
151. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
supra note 11, art. 1(4)-(5).
152. See generally Causes of Conflict 2012, supra note 8.
153. In Congo v. Burundi, the African Commission rejected as “impermissible” Uganda’s
argument that it had launched operations in the territory of Congo in order to safeguard its
national security interests since armed rebel groups hostile to Burundi, Rwanda, and
Uganda had sanctuary in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Democratic Republic of Congo
v.
Burundi,
Rwanda,
Uganda,
227/99,
ACHPR,
¶
76
(May
2003),
http://caselaw.ihrda.org/doc/227.99/view/. See also Armed Activities on Territory of
Congo (Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶¶ 35-36 (Dec. 19, 2005).
154. See also OAU Great Lakes Refugees, supra note 112, ¶ 15. See generally Institute for
Human Rights and Development in Africa v. Guinea, 249/02, ACHPR, ¶ 71 (2004),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/36th/comunications/249.02/achpr36_249_02_eng.p
df (explaining that similar problems arose in Africa, and the African Commission
acknowledged that Guinea had legitimate concerns about “threats to its national security
posed by the attacks from Sierra Leone and Liberia with a flow of rebels and arms across
the border”).
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what it described as a “ladder of options” which identifies
proportionate measures to perceived threats.155
It is important to note that the principle of non-refoulement is
given measurable support by Article 12(3)-(4) of the African
Charter.156 The latter clause protects against arbitrary expulsions,
stating that an alien lawfully in the territory of a State may be
expelled only in accordance with due process of law.157 The African
Commission held that the provision must be interpreted to prevent
unjustifiable expulsions.158 Furthermore, if the procedure for
155. Under Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the “ladder of options” includes
the following measures: (a) enhancing existing national law enforcement mechanisms; (b)
international support for national security forces; (c) deployment of international factfinding missions and observers; (d) deployment of international/regional police forces; and
the (e) deployment of international/regional military forces. U.N. Economic and Social
Council Rep. of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of
Internally Displaced Persons, ¶ 41, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/80, 61st Sess. (Jan. 25, 2005)
[hereinafter UNESC 2005 Doc.].
156. Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 55 Eur. Ct. H.R. 627, ¶ 167 (on Article 12(3) of the African
Charter).
157. Organisation mondiale contre la torture, Association Internationale des juristes
démocrates, Commission internationale des juristes, Union Interafricaine des Droits de
l’Homme v. Rwanda, 27/89-46/91-49/91-99/93, ACHPR, ¶ 30 (Oct. 1996),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/20th/comunications/27.89-46.91-49.9199.93/achpr20_27.89_46.91_49.91_99.93_eng.pdf; c.f., Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950, Nov. 22,
1984, 1525 U.N.T.S. 195. See generally Katani and Others v. Germany, App. No. 67679/01,
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
(May
31,
2001),
available
at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-32456 (it is regrettable for
the interests of refugees that Article 6 of the ECHR has been found inapplicable to asylum
procedures).
158. The African Commission states further that while the African Charter does not
prohibit deportations as such, the State’s right to expel individuals does not justify the
manner in which it does so. Rencontre Africaine pour la Défence des Droits de l’Homme v.
Zambia, Comm. No. 71/92, ACHPR, ¶ 23 (1996); see also Union Interafricaine des Droits de
l’Homme,
et
al.
v.
Angola,
ACHPR,
¶¶
19–20
(Nov.
11,
1997),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/22nd/comunications/159.96/achpr22_159_96_eng.p
df; Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v. Angola, 292/04, ACHPR, ¶ 63
(May
7-22,
2008),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/43rd/comunications/292.04/achpr43_292_04_eng.p
df. In such cases the ECHR has stated that a principal concern is whether effective
guarantees exist that protect applicants against arbitrary refoulement, be it direct or
indirect, to the country from which he or she has fled. See generally, e.g., Müslim v. Turkey,
App.
No.
53566/99,
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
(Apr.
26,
2005),
available
at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-68896. See also M.S.S. v.
Belgium and Greece, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 28, ¶ 83 (2011); Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 55 Eur. Ct. H.R.
627, ¶ 147–48, 177–78 (2012) (Pinto de Albuquerque, J., concurring). Additionally, the
ECHR held a refuge seeker should not be removed from their country of origin without
having had the opportunity to make an effective asylum claim to the domestic authorities
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expulsion entails arrest and detention, the safeguards relating to
deprivation of liberty are applicable, as is the right to have the case
reviewed.159 This contention is supported in Organisation Mondiale
Contre La Torture and the Association Internationale des Juristes
Democrates and Others v. Rwanda, where the African Commission
found that, by expelling Burundian refugees without giving them
the opportunity to be heard by a competent court, Rwanda was in
breach of Article 7(1) of the African Charter.160 Consequently,
Rwanda had additionally violated Article 12(4) of the African Charter
by prohibiting the arbitrary expulsion of such persons from the
country of asylum.161
Opinion is divided as to whether the principle of nonrefoulement must be observed in cases of mass influx of displaced
persons, or whether States may legitimately invoke the national
security exception in such situations, absent as such from the OAU
Convention.162 Events in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa in
the mid-1990s highlighted the difficulties faced by African States in
coping with the reception of large numbers of refugees.163 Borders
were closed and more than one million Rwandan and Burundian
refugees were forced to leave Zaïre and Tanzania and return to
their country of origin to face an uncertain future.164 These events
took place against a background of violence and infiltration by
armed gangs who were opponents of the new regimes in Rwanda
or, should a need arise, an application to the Court for interim measures of protection. See
KRS v. United Kingdom, App. No. 32733/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Dec. 2, 2008), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-90500.
159. Organisation mondiale contre la torture v. Rwanda, 27/89-46/91-49/91-99/93,
¶¶ 28, 34.
160. Id. ¶ 35.
161. Id. ¶ 31.
162. TFEU, supra note 20, art. 78, would suggest so. The Temporary Protection
Directive explicitly applies the principle of non-refoulement to cases of mass influx of
displaced persons. Council Directive 2001/55/EC, supra note 16, art. 3(2). Judge Pinto de
Albuquerque was clearly of this view. Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 55 Eur. Ct. H.R. 627, ¶ 170.
163. Gérard Prunier, The Geopolitical Situation in the Great Lakes Area in Light of the
Kivu Crisis, Feb. 1 1997, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6be0.html.
164. See generally INT’L CRISIS GROUP, BURUNDIAN REFUGEES IN TANZANIA: A KEY FACTOR TO
THE BURUNDI PEACE PROCESS, ICG CENTRAL AFRICA REPORT N°12 (1999). Further, under Article
2(4) OAU Convention, provision is made for burden sharing if a State finds difficulty in
continuing to grant asylum to refugees. A State may thus appeal directly to other States or
through the AU for appropriate measures to be taken in the spirit of African solidarity and
international co-operation to lessen that burden. OAU Convention Governing the Specific
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, supra note 11, art. 2(4).
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and Burundi. 165 Many of these gangs were complicit with the
massacres perpetrated in those countries, and used the refugee
camps for subversive activities.166 The African Commission will take
note of the legitimate national security concerns of States,167 which
is not unlimited however.168 Nevertheless, the practice of the
African Commission establishes that the principle of nonrefoulement is applicable in cases of mass influx of refugees.169
An important consideration in this context is Article 12(5) of
the African Charter. This article prohibits the mass expulsion of
aliens and is described by the African Commission as “a special
threat to human rights.”170 This provision also applies to refugees
and refuge seekers.171 In Organisation Mondiale contre la Torture
and the Association Internationale des Juristes Democrates and
165. Id.
166. See generally INT’L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 164.
167. See Rencontre Africaine pour la Défence des Droits de l’Homme v. Zambia, Comm.
No. 71/92, ACHPR, ¶ 23 (1996). However, the burden of proof lies with the State. In
Organisation mondiale contre la torture v. Rwanda, 27/89-46/91-49/91-99/93, ¶ 1, the
expulsion of refugees was justified by Rwanda on national security grounds. When the State
failed to respond to the allegations of human rights abuses the African Commission decided
on the facts provided by the complainant. The established practice of the Commission in
such instances is that, “[i]f the government provides no evidence to contradict an allegation
of human rights violation made against it, the Commission will take it as proven, or at the
least probable or plausible.” See Amnesty International, et al. v. Sudan, 48/90-50/91-52/9189/93,
ACHPR,
¶
52
(Nov.
15,
1999),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/26th/comunications/48.90-50.91-52.9189.93/achpr26_48.90_50.91_52.91_89.93_eng.pdf.
168. See Democratic Republic of Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, 227/99, ACHPR, ¶
76 (May 2003), http://caselaw.ihrda.org/doc/227.99/view/. See also Armed Activities on
Territory of Congo (Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶¶ 35–36 (Dec. 19, 2005).
169. In Doebbler v. Sudan, the question of whether the principle of non-refoulement
applied to 14,000 Ethiopian refugees residing in Sudan was central to the case. Doebbler v.
Sudan, Comm. No. 235/00, ¶ 146.
170. Rencontre Africaine pour la Défence des Droits de l’Homme v. Zambia, Comm. No.
71/92, ACHPR, ¶ 20 (1996); Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v.
Guinea,
249/02,
ACHPR,
¶
69
(2004),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/36th/comunications/249.02/achpr36_249_02_eng.p
df. The conditions for mass expulsion are satisfied where arrests occur over a period of
several months at different places and deportation orders are served at different dates.
Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v. Angola, 292/04, ACHPR, ¶ 69 (May
7-22,
2008),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/43rd/comunications/292.04/achpr43_292_04_eng.p
df.. The mass expulsion of aliens is prohibited by other treaties, such as the Fourth Protocol.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Protocol 7, Nov. 4, 1950, 2004-2013 C.E.T.S. No. 204.
171. See Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 55 Eur. Ct. H.R. 627, ¶¶ 179–81 (2012) (Pinto de
Albuquerque, J., concurring).
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Others v. Rwanda the African Commission found that the expulsion
of Burundian refugees on the basis of their nationality violated
Article 12(5) of the African Charter.172 While the African
Commission has taken cognizance of the economic and other
challenges faced by many African States hosting large numbers of
refugees and that States may sometimes resort to extreme
measures to protect their citizens and economies, nevertheless,
“such measures should not be taken to the detriment of the
enjoyment of human rights” and the mass expulsion of persons,
whether on the basis of nationality, race, ethnicity or religion, “is
generally qualified as discriminatory in this sense as it has no legal
basis.”173 The African Commission has therefore stressed that such
expulsions must comply with the human rights obligations in the
African Charter,174 including due process requirements.175
It is important not to overlook the fact that a state’s ability to
refoule a person may be constrained by the operation of other
human rights commitments.176 The non-refoulement obligation can
become operative as a result of a breach or the risk of a breach of
the spirit of any guaranteed right.177 The degree of the obligation is
dependent on the nature of the right at stake. When the receiving
State is at risk of violating an absolute right, the obligation of nonrefoulement assumes a categorical aspect.178 When there is a risk of
a violation of any other qualified right that allows for derogation,
172. Organisation mondiale contre la torture, Association Internationale des juristes
démocrates, Commission internationale des juristes, Union Interafricaine des Droits de
l’Homme v. Rwanda, 27/89-46/91-49/91-99/93, ACHPR, ¶ 33 (Oct. 1996),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/20th/comunications/27.89-46.91-49.9199.93/achpr20_27.89_46.91_49.91_99.93_eng.pdf.
173. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v. Guinea, 249/02, ¶¶ 67–
69. See also Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme, et al. v. Angola, ACHPR, ¶¶ 15–16
(Nov.
11,
1997),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/22nd/comunications/159.96/achpr22_159_96_eng.p
df; Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v. Angola, 292/04, ¶ 68.
174. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v. Angola, 292/04, ¶ 69.
175. Persons are thus “entitled to submit reasons against the expulsion, have the case
reviewed and be represented for these purposes before a competent authority.” Id. ¶ 70.
176. HATHAWAY, supra note 21, at 304–05.
177. HARRIS, supra note 74, at 80–85.
178. See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, [1989] ) 11 EHRR 439; Chahal v. United, [1996]
23 EHRR 413; Othman (Abu Qatada) v. United Kingdom, [2012] 55 EHRR 1, available at
http:www.echr.coe.int. See also Article 22(8) of the American Convention on Human Rights;
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. See M38/2002 v. Minister
for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 131, ¶ 37 (Austl.).
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the returning State is required to assess the proportionality of the
competing principles at issue—except when the risk of a right’s
violation in the receiving state is “flagrant” and the very essence of
that right is in jeopardy.179 Consequently, if refoulement were to
result in a person facing torture, the returning State would be
prevented by the operation of Article 5 of the African Charter (which
protects human dignity) from doing so.180 Whereas an individual’s
separation from one’s family could be deemed a breach of Article 5 of
the African Charter (which protects human dignity),181 it could be
justifiable if the threat posed outweighed the rights secured to the
individual. The same standard applies to universal human rights
law, which may be binding on African States. Article 3(1) of the UN
Convention Against Torture 1984 expressly prohibits refoulement
where “substantial grounds” exist for believing that the person would
be in danger of being tortured.182 Article 16(1) of the UN
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance 2006 is basically identically worded.183
Furthermore, while the ECHR contains no explicit prohibition, the
principle has been acknowledged by the European Court of Human
Rights as extending beyond the similar guarantee under
international refugee law; its jurisprudence clearly establishes that
expulsions will breach Article 3 of the ECHR if the individual in
question faces a real risk of ill-treatment in the receiving State.184 This
179. HARRIS, supra note 74, at 418-20. See also M38/2002 v. Minister for Immigration &
Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 131, ¶ 39 (Austl.).
180. Based on the jurisprudence of the ECHR and by analogy to ECHR, article 3.
181. Amnesty International, et al. v. Sudan, 48/90-50/91-52/91-89/93, ACHPR, ¶ 54
(Nov. 15, 1999), http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/26th/comunications/48.90-50.9152.91-89.93/achpr26_48.90_50.91_52.91_89.93_eng.pdf; Law Office of Ghazi Suleiman v.
Sudan,
222/98-229/99,
ACHPR,
¶
44
(May
2003),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/33rd/comunications/222.98229.99/achpr33_222.98_229.99_eng.pdf.
182. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, art. 3(1), adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention
Against Torture]; Elmi v. Australia, Comm. No. 120/1998, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/22/D/120/1998
(May 25, 1999); U.N. G.A. Rep. of the Committee Against Torture, 50th Sess., ¶ 8.1, U.N. Doc.
A/50/44 (July 26, 1995).
183. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearances, adopted Dec. 20 2006, UNGA Res. 61/177, text A/RES/61/488.
184. Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 55 Eur. Ct. H.R. 627, ¶ 168 (2012) (Pinto de Albuquerque, J.,
concurring) (stating “[u]nder the European Convention, a refugee cannot be subjected to
refoulement to his or her country of origin or any other country where he or she risks
incurring serious harm caused by any identified or unidentified person or public or private
entity”); see also Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831, 1853; Saadi v. Italy,
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also holds true for the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.185
Other essential general principles applicable to the exceptions
to non-refoulement are first—they must be interpreted restrictively
or proportionately,186 and secondly, must be applied only to the
particular circumstances of the case and based on the personal
conduct of the individual concerned.187 Refoulement must therefore
be compatible with human rights.
F. Voluntary repatriation
Article 5 of the OAU Convention contains another distinctive
right in making provision for voluntary repatriation.188 In light of
the principle of non-refoulement, no refugee shall be repatriated
against his/her will.189 If a refugee does wish to be repatriated, the
country of origin and the country of asylum are obliged to
collaborate to ensure the refugee’s safe return;190 nor should
returning refugees be victimized for having left.191 In addition,
refugees who freely decide to return to their homeland on their
own initiative or as the result of assurances, must have their return
facilitated by the country of origin, the country of asylum, voluntary
agencies, NGOs, and international organizations.192 While voluntary
repatriation may offer one of the best solutions to the refugee
2008-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 145, 245; Ismoilov v. Russia, App. No. 2947/06, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 115,
126,
128
(Apr.
24,
2008),
available
at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-86086.
See
generally
Lambert, supra note 24, at 161–92.
185. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171. ARJ v. Australia, Human Rights Comm., 60th Sess., July 14-Aug. 1, 1997, ¶ 6.9,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/692/1996 (Aug. 11, 1997).
186. HARRIS, supra note 74, at 10–11.
187. Joined Cases C-57/09 & C-101/09, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. B & D, 2010
E.C.R. I-10979, ¶¶ 12, 106–09 (holding the test to be applied concerns the profound
seriousness of the acts committed by the individual and of that individual’s individual
responsibility for them).
188. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
supra note 11, art. 5. Note that Article 21(1) Temporary Protection Directive requires
Member States to make voluntary return possible. Council Directive 2001/55/EC, supra
note 16, art. 21(1).
189. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
supra note 11, art. 5(1).
190. Id. art. 5(2).
191. Id. art. 5(4).
192. Id. art. 5(5).
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crisis,193 it is apparent that unless the root causes that created the
displacement in the first place are not remedied, the prospects of
voluntary repatriation will prove negligible. Consequently, the
return of relative stability and security to parts of Africa such as
Angola, Liberia, Namibia, and Sierra Leone has led to the large-scale
repatriation of refugees.194 Moreover, voluntary repatriation can
only be made more effective if human rights are protected, the rule
of law is respected, property restitution is addressed, and the safety
of returnees can be assured.195
Naturally, voluntary repatriation would be meaningless if a
refugee was prevented from returning to their country of origin. It
needs to be recalled that according to international human rights
norms, a person cannot be arbitrarily deprived of the right to return
to their country.196 The OAU Convention does not address this issue,
but under general international law, a national cannot be denied
entry to his or her country of origin.197 According to Article 12(2) of
the Banjul Charter, an individual has the right to return to his or her
country subject to the law of public order and security.198
193. Awuku, supra note 11, at 85. In resolution 2003/52, the UN Commission on Human
Rights makes the point that return is not and should not be perceived as the only solution to
forcible displacement, but that resettlement and local integration are policies that should
also be considered. Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2003/52, Human Rights and Mass
Exoduses, U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, 59th Sess., Apr. 4, 2003, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/RES/2003/52 (Apr. 24, 2003). Under article 33 of the Qualification Directive,
Member States are required to make provision for integration programs. Qualification
Directive, supra note 9, art. 33.
194. See UNESC 2005 Doc., supra note 155, ¶ 56. In Doebbler, the African Commission
found that thousands of Ethiopian refugees repatriated voluntarily following the end of the
Ethiopian-Eritrean war. Doebbler v. Sudan, Comm. No. 235/00, ¶ 161.
195. See Kigali Declaration, African Union [AU] Ministerial Conference on Human Rights
in Africa, 1st Sess., Doc. Min/Conf/HRA/Decl.1(I), (May 8, 2003). In this respect the AU’s
Peace and Security Council has a role to play. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the
Peace and Security Council of the African Union, art. 14(3)(d), adopted July 9, 2002, AFR.
UNION,
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol_peace_and_security.pdf.
According to Awuku, amnesty laws may have to be adopted where necessary. Awuku, supra
note 11, at 85.
196. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 34, art.
13(2).
197. Id.; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 12(2), opened
for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; THE AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, STUDIES IN
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL POLICY NO. 23, THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS ACROSS BORDERS 85 (Louis B.
Sohn & Thomas Buergenthal eds., 1992).
198. Alhassan Abubakar v. Ghana, 103/93, ACHPR, ¶ 13 (Oct. 1996),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/20th/comunications/103.93/achpr20_103_93_eng.p
df.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The OAU Convention advanced existing international refugee
law, setting a more generous legal standard.199 Particularly worthy
of note is the extension of the definition of the concept of the
refugee, its acceptance of asylum, the strengthening of the principle
of non-refoulement and provision for voluntary repatriation.200
These were welcome humanitarian developments that sought to
address Africa’s considerable refugee problems in some way. These
commitments were subsequently endorsed by the OAU and the UN
in a number of special conferences—particularly, the 1979 Arusha
Conference and the 1994 Addis Ababa Recommendations—
convened to discuss the challenges posed by the refugee crises in
Africa and to offer concrete proposals.201 In urging the OAU Member
States to comply more effectively with their international
obligations, these conferences proved an important expression of
the political will of OAU Member States to reaffirm their legal and
humanitarian obligations in accordance with the UN and OAU/AU
Conventions. Of course, this is not to suggest that the OAU
Convention is a work of perfection. The OAU Convention certainly
has its flaws as it does not provide the same degree of detail as the
UN Convention. In light of other new developments, particularly in
the EU, it seems fair comment that the African response, once
considered pioneering, now appears somewhat dated.202 For
example, the discretion of States remains largely unfettered. Unlike
the EU, there exists no uniform set of procedures for determination
of refugee status and appeals.203 There should, therefore, be a
uniform process that is fair and effective to deal with all
applications for political asylum so that all humanitarian refugees
199. VILJOEN, supra note 64, at 258 (describing the OAU Convention as creating “an
impressive normative framework”). Similar sentiments may be expressed in relation to the
Kampala Convention, if for no other reason than the fact that currently it is the only
universal or regional legal instrument specifically providing for the comprehensive
protection of IDPs.
200. Hofmann, supra note 11, at 329; Awuku, supra note 11, at 86.
201. See generally International Conference on the Situation of Refugees in Africa,
Arusha, Tanzania, May 7-17, 1979, Recommendations from the Pan-African Conference on the
Situation of Refugees in Africa, Arusha (Tanzania), (May 17, 1979); OAU Addis Ababa Doc.,
supra note 107.
202. It seems worth reiterating that with the Kampala Convention, Africa is again
setting the pace.
203. Doebbler v. Sudan, Comm. No. 235/00, 27th Activity Report 2009, ¶ 165.
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receive identical treatment.204 Detention of humanitarian refugees
should be avoided unless there is no suitable alternative and should
be monitored by judicial authorities.205 Procedural safeguards must
be applied. All humanitarian refugees should have a right of appeal
if their application is rejected by the receiving State in accordance
with Article 7(1)(a) of the African Charter.206 Applications for
asylum should be processed promptly and delays in reaching
decisions should be kept to a minimum.207 The drafters of these
treaties did not envisage a more recent phenomenon, that of largescale illicit migratory flows by sea, including refugees and refuge
seekers, from Africa to Europe. Certain North African States must
therefore engage with their responsibilities towards the intercepted
irregular migrants—usually victims of human trafficking—who are
in need of international protection.208 And it is important that
African States that have not yet done so accede to the UN and/or
OAU Conventions.209 The African Commission has considerable
influence on the progressive development of the law in this area.
The fact that the African Charter, in addition to other human rights
standards, is deemed applicable to refugees is highly significant

204. See Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 55 Eur. Ct. H.R. 627, ¶ 179–81 (2012) (Pinto de
Albuquerque, J., concurring) (suggesting minimum refugee status determination
procedures).
205. The right to liberty and security of the person is guaranteed by the African Charter,
Article 6 and applies to all deprivations of liberty. Purohit and Moore v. Gambia, 241/01,
ACHPR,
¶
64
(May
2003),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/33rd/comunications/241.01/achpr33_241_01_eng.p
df.
206. Organisation mondiale contre la torture, Association Internationale des juristes
démocrates, Commission internationale des juristes, Union Interafricaine des Droits de
l’Homme v. Rwanda, 27/89-46/91-49/91-99/93, ACHPR, ¶ 34 (Oct. 1996),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/20th/comunications/27.89-46.91-49.9199.93/achpr20_27.89_46.91_49.91_99.93_eng.pdf. Cf. Doebbler v. Sudan, Comm. No. 235/00,
¶ 116 (However, the African Commission has expressed the view that it is not always
reasonable to expect refugees to apply to the courts “given their extreme vulnerability and
state of deprivation, their fear of being deported and their lack of adequate means to seek
legal representation.”).
207. African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, supra note 75, art. 7(1)(d).
208. See generally Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air,
adopted Nov. 15, 2000, 2241 U.N.T.S. 507 (supplementing the United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime).
209. In Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 55 Eur. Ct. H.R. 627, ¶¶ 147–48, the European Court of
Human Rights was critical of Libya, observing that it had not ratified the Geneva Convention
on Refugee Status, that any asylum procedure was lacking and that the Libyan authorities
refused to recognize the refugee status granted by the UNHCR.

NALDI_FOR_PUB

152

10/21/2014 6:42 PM

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 36:115

because it means at the very least that refugees are entitled to basic
rights and must be treated with dignity.210 However, in practical
terms, much remains to be done as African States generally lack the
financial, logistical and material resources to deal with the
challenges posed by refugee crises.211 Refugees are sometimes kept
in degrading conditions. It is vital that minimum standards for the
reception of refugees and asylum seekers in relation to healthcare,
housing, education and work, for example, be adopted.212 It is clear
that African States must acquire and develop early-warning and
early-action systems—as called for by Resolution 2003/52 of the
UN Commission on Human Rights—to react more promptly to
evolving crises. Timely donor assistance, judiciously spent, is also
important. But the root causes of mass displacement must be
effectively addressed, which includes ending a culture of impunity
for human rights and humanitarian law violations. Peace, security
and stability must be the foremost consideration; otherwise the
international community is dealing in palliatives and the sorry
plight of refugees will continue to blight Africa.

210. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v. Guinea, 249/02, ACHPR,
¶¶
67–69
(2004),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/36th/comunications/249.02/achpr36_249_02_eng.p
df.
211. An additional difficulty is posed by a general lack of domestic legislation on the
issue on the part of many African States. Hofmann, supra note 11, at 329-30; VILJOEN, supra
note 64, at 258. See Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 55 Eur. Ct. H.R. 627, ¶¶ 147–48 (The European
Court of Human Rights was deeply concerned with the absence of any form of asylum and
protection procedure for refugees in Libya and the impossibility of making the Libyan
authorities recognize the refugee status granted by the UNHCR, which meant there were
insufficient guarantees protecting the parties concerned from the risk of being arbitrarily
returned to their countries of origin).
212. See cf. Council Directive 2003/9/EC, supra note 50, ¶ 18 (on minimum standards
for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or
as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection
granted).

